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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

J

Plaintiff-Respondent, it

Case No. 880211-CA

I

V •

Ji

JERRY LEE VELARDE,
Defendant-Appellant.

Priority No. 2

i

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a denial of defendant's Motion to
Withdraw a Guilty Plea to Attempted Mayhem,) a third-degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-105 (1978), in the
Third Judicial District Court.

This Court has jurisdiction to

hear this appeal under Utah Code Ann. S 7842a-3f2)(f)(Supp.
1988).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether this appeal is moot because defendant has

served his sentence?
2.

Whether the trial court properly denied defendant's

Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea finding that defendant did not
show "good causeM for withdrawal?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-ll(e)(Supp. 1988)t
The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty
or no contest and shall not accept such a plea
until the court has made the findings:
(1) That if the defendant is not
represented by counsel he has knowingly

waived his right to counsel and does not
desire counsel;
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) That the defendant knows he has
rights against compulsory self-incrimination,
to a jury trial and to confront and crossexamine in open court the witnesses against
him, and that by entering the plea he waives
all of those rights;
(4) That the defendant understands the
nature and elements of the offense to which
he is entering the plea; that upon trial the
prosecution would have the burden of proving
each of those elements beyond a reasonable
doubt; and that the plea is an admission of
all those elements:
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum
and maximum sentence that may be imposed upon
him for each offense to which a plea is
entered, including the possibility of the
imposition of consecutive sentences; and
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result
of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement
and if so, what agreement has been reached.
If it appears that the prosecuting
attorney or any other party has agreed to
request or recommend the acceptance of a plea
to a less included offense, or the dismissal
of other charges, the same shall be approved
by the court. If recommendations as to
sentence are allowed by the court, the court
shall advise the defendant personally that
any recommendation as to sentence is not
binding on the court.
Utah Code Ann. S 77-13-6 (1982)t
Withdrawal of Plea. A plea of
be withdrawn at any time prior
A plea of guilty or no contest
withdrawn only upon good cause
leave of court.

not guilty may
to conviction.
may be
shown and with

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Jerry Lee Velarde, was charged with Mayhem,
a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.S 76-5-105
(1978).

Defendant pled guilty to Attempted Mayhem, a third

degree felony, on January 24, 1984, in the Third Judicial
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Jay E.
-2-

Banks, Judge, presiding.

Defendant was sentenced by Judge Banks

on January 30, 1984, to a term or zero to five years in the Utah
State Prison to be served concurrently with defendant's previous
conviction.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On August 30, 1983, defendant was arrested and charged
with Mayhem, a second-degree felony (R. 3). The information
alleged that defendant "jumped on the victim, Michael S. Terry,
and bit off the upper portion of the victim's ear, completely
tearing the upper portion away from the ear itself." (R. 11) (See
Addendum MA"; Information).

At the time of his arrest, defendant

was on parole from the Utah State Prison for other felony crimes
(R. 10). Following the arrest, defendant was returned to the
Utah State Prison (R. 3).
At a preliminary hearing on September 8, 1983,
defendant waived a formal reading of the information (R. 4). The
victim, Michael S. Terry, testified that as a result of the
assault by defendant, the upper portion of his ear was
dismembered (R. 5). Defendant was present during the victim's
testimony (R. 5). Based upon the evidence adduced, Judge Michael
Hutchings bound defendant over to the district court for trial
(R. 4).
Defendant was arraigned in the district court on
September 30, 1983 (R. 12). A copy of the information was given
to defendant and he entered a plea of "not guilty" to the Mayhem
charge (R. 12). Defendant notified the ccjmrt that he intended to
rely on the defense of insanity (R. 13).

3-

On December 1, 1983, in a collateral case, defendant
was convicted of second-degree murder, a first-degree felony, and
was sentenced to a term or five years to life in the Utah State
Prison (R. 40).
On January 24, 1984, defendant entered a change of plea
to the Mayhem charge (R. 16). At the change of plea proceeding,
the information was read to the defendant and he entered a plea
of "guilty" to Attempted Mayhem (R. 16) (See Addendum "B";
Transcript:

Addendum "C"; Plea Affidavit).

Judge Jay E. Banks

sentenced defendant to a term of zero to five years in the Utah
State Prison to run concurrently with defendant's second-degree
murder conviction (R. 19-20).
On appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, the second-degree
murder conviction was reversed and defendant subsequently pled
guilty to Manslaughter, a second-degree felony. (R. 89, p. 2).
Defendant was sentenced to serve one to fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison for manslaughter (R. 89, p. 3).
On August 31, 1987, three and one-half years after
defendant entered his guilty plea, defendant filed a Motion to
Withdraw his Guilty Plea to Attempted Mayhem (R. 25). After a
hearing, Judge Raymond S. Uno denied the motion (R. 25, 89).
Defendant's motion was denied a second time after an evidentiary
hearing on February 8, 1988 (R. 26, 40). No witnesses were
called at the evidentiary hearing. Id. Finally a hearing was held
on September 12, 1988 to once again determine if defendant's plea
was voluntary. (Transcript dated September 12, 1988).
hearing the arguments of the parties, Judge Uno denied

-4-

After

defendant's motion for the third time (R. 7^). Defendant now
appeals the denial of his motion.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This appeal is moot since defendant has served his
five-year sentence.

Accordingly, this Court should not consider

the merits of defendant's claims where no collateral consequences
exist and defendant caused the matter to become moot through his
failure to timely appeal.
The trial court did not abuse it$ discretion in finding
that defendant's guilty plea was voluntary and knowing where a
copy of the information was read to defendant, he was present
during preliminary hearing testimony of the victim, and he
acknowledged his willingness to enter a voluntary guilty plea
both orally and in writing by admitting the elements of the
offense after consulting with his attorney.

Further, the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow defendant
to withdraw his guilty plea based on defendant's alleged
misunderstanding of the consequences of the guilty plea; namely,
that his prior second-degree murder conviction could and would be
reversed on appeal.

The record clearly establishes that

defendant understood the statutory sentence for the offense
charged and that the trial court could impose the maximum
sentence to run concurrently or consecutively with defendant's
other sentence.

-5-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE HAS BEEN SERVED,
THIS APPEAL IS MOOT.
Defendant pled guilty and was sentenced on January 24,
1984 to serve not more than five years in the Utah State Prison.
(See Addendum "B M ; Transcript).

Defendant's sentence was

completed on January 24, 1989. Thus, defendant's appeal is now
moot.
The Utah Supreme Court has declined to consider appeals
where the issues raised have become moot.

In State v. Davis, 721

P.2d 894, 895 (Utah 1986), the defendant appealed claiming his
sentencing orders were invalid and requested that the case be
remanded for resentencing.

The Supreme Court held that the

matter was moot since the defendant had served his sentence. Id.
see also Richardson v. State, 402 N.E.2d 1012, 1013 (Ind. App.
1980) (Appeal attacking sentence is moot where sentence has been
completed).

The Court said that "'[w]here the requested judicial

relief can no longer affect the rights of the litigants, the case
is moot and a court will normally refrain from adjudicating it on
the merits.rM Ld. at 895, quoting, Spain v. Stewart, 639 P.2d
166, 168 (Utah 1981).

The Court noted an exception to the

mootne8s doctrine where there is a Hcontinuing and recurring
controversy."

Davis at 895, citing, Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d

896 (Utah 1981).
In Baker v. State, 240 Ga. 431, 241 S.E.2d 187 (1978),
cert, denied, 439 U.S. 881 (1978) the Supreme Court of Georgia
dismissed on appeal attacking the constitutionality of a criminal
6-

statute where the issue had been rendered moot by the completion
of the sentence.

The Court observed that while an appellate

court may exercise its discretion whether to decide a criminal
case after the sentence has been served, it is not bound to do
so. Ld. at 188, citing, Jacobs v. New York, 388 U.S. 431 (1967);
Tannenbaum v. New York, 388 U.S. 439 (1967) reh'g. denied, 689
U.S. 842 (1967).

The Georgia Court chose nbt to reach the merits

of the appeal "because the defendant has not demonstrated any
efforts to expedite the appeal, preparation of record, etc., and
has not shown, on this record, adverse collateral consequences
. . .-

Baker at 188 (citations omitted).
In Holmes v. United States, 383 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir.

1967) the court held that an appeal was moot where the sentence
was served and there were no collateral disadvantages which
appellant may incur as a result of the conviction. I_d. at 927.
The Court found that where the defendant had been convicted of
fourteen previous misdemeanor offenses, hi$ fifteenth misdemeanor
I
conviction did not create a collateral disadvantage. Id.
In the present case, defendant was incarcerated at the
I
Utah State Prison for a second-degree murder conviction at the
time of his guilty plea.

Both the Homicide and Mayhem charge

occurred while defendant was on parole from the Utah State Prison
for other felony convictions (See Addendum "A"; Information).
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Under these circumstances, it is apparent that no collateral
consequences exist in light of defendant's previous felony
convictions.
Additionally, this Court should not exercise its
discretion to decide a criminal case which has become moot as a
result of defendant's own failure.

As set forth above, Judge Uno

denied defendant's first Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea on August
31, 1987 (R. 25). Rather than pursue a direct appeal from the
denial, defendant twice more requested that he be permitted to
withdraw his plea (R. 26, 40, 77). Had defendant pursued an
appeal from the first denial of his motion, his appeal would have
been submitted to this Court prior to the termination of his
sentence.

Instead, defendant failed to expedite appellate review

and the issue has now become moot.

Therefore, this Court should

not consider the merits of defendant's claims.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW
HIS GUILTY PLEA.
A. Defendant's Guilty Plea Was Knowingly,
Intelligently, And Voluntarily Entered.
Defendant claims that Judge Raymond S. Uno abused his
discretion in denying his Motion to Withdraw his guilty plea.
Defendant argues that his guilty plea was unknowing, involuntary

It should be noted that if defendant is permitted to withdraw
his plea, he will again face the original Mayhem charge, a
second-degree felony, and if convicted, may be sentenced to serve
one to fifteen years in prison, a term longer than he has already
served and which may be imposed consecutive to his Manslaughter
sentence.
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and unintelligent because he did not understand the consequences
of his guilty plea.

Defendant's claim is wholly without merit.

Utah Code Ann. S 77-13-6 (1982) provides that a plea of
guilty may be withdrawn as follows:
Withdrawal of plea. A plea of guilty may be
withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. A
plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn
only upon good cause shown and with leave of
court.
Id.

Accordingly, a criminal defendant may not withdraw a guilty

plea as a matter of right, but only upon a showing of "good
cause." State v. Plum, 14 Utah 2d 124, 378 P.2d 671 (1963); State
v. Harris, 585 P.2d 450 (Utah 1978).

A motion to withdraw a

guilty plea is addressed to the trial court's discretion.

State

v. Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah 1977); State v. Garfield, 552
P.2d 129 (Utah 1976).

As in all discretionary matters afforded

the trial judge's prerogatives as well as his advantaged
position, reviewing courts accord considerable latitude to the
trial judge's discretion and will not interfere "unless it
plainly appears that there was abuse thereof," Forsyth, 560 P.2d
at 339 (footnote omitted).
In the instant case, defendant failed to establish
below that his plea was unknowing, involuntary or unintelligent.
In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), the United States
Supreme Court held that it was reversible error for a trial court
to accept a guilty plea without an affirmative showing in the
record that it was made intelligently and voluntarily.

In

Boykin, the petitioner pled guilty to five indictments charging
common law robbery and was sentenced to death.
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The -ludae asked

no questions of the defendant concerning his plea, and the
defendant did not address the court.

The Court stated:

Several federal constitutional rights are
involved in a waiver that takes place when a
plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal
trial. First, is the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by
the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the
States by reason of the Fourteenth. . . .
Second, is the right to trial by jury. . . .
Third, is the right to confront one's
accusers. We cannot presume a waiver of
these three important federal rights from a
silent record.
Id. at 243 (citations omitted).

As a result of Boykin, minimum

requirements were established which a court must meet when a
defendant enters a guilty plea.
The United States Supreme Court in two decisions
subsequent to Boykin further clarified the relationship between a
knowingly and voluntarily entered plea and the defendant's
constitutional rights.

In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742

(1970), and North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), the
Court, citing Boykin, upheld guilty pleas as voluntarily and
intelligently made without any indication that specification of
the Boykin trilogy of constitutional rights was required to be
made at the time of the acceptance of the pleas.

In clarifying

Boykin, the Court stated:
[T]he new element added in Boykin was the
requirement that the record must
affirmatively disclose that a defendant who
pleaded guilty entered his plea
understandingly and voluntarily.
Brady, 397 U.S. at 747-48, fn. 4.

The Brady court looked to the

issue of voluntariness and intelligence of the person taking the
plea without tying its analysis to the strictures of the Boykin
-10-

litany.

The Court considered all relevant circumstances

surrounding the guilty plea in order to determine its
voluntariness.

Likewise, in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S.

25 (1970), the determination of whether a plea was made
voluntarily and intelligently did not rest upon the structured
questions of the Boykin litany, but rather upon the determination
of -whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent
choice among the alternative courses of action open to the
defendant."

Alford, 400 U.S. at 31.

In addition, other courts have differed as to how
strictly the Boykin standard must be followed in guilty plea
proceedings.

A majority of courts have held that as a matter of

constitutional due process, a defendant's constitutional rights
to a jury trial, confrontation, and protection against selfincrimination need not be specifically and expressly articulated
by the trial judge and expressly waived by the accused prior to
the acceptance of the guilty plea.

See e.g., Rouse v. Foster,

672 P.2d 649, 651 (8th Cir. 1982); Neely vl Duckworth, 473 F.
Supp. 288 (N.D. Ind. 1979); Wilkins v. Erickson, 505 F.2d 761
(9th Cir. 1974); Stinson v. Turner, 473 F.£d 913, 915-16 (10th
Cir. 1973); McChesney v. Henderson, 482 F.fid 1101, 1106-10 (5th
Cir. 1973) cert, denied McChesney v. Henderson, 414 U.S. 1146
(5th Cir, 1974); Wood v. Morris, 87 Wash. 2d 501, 554 P.2d 1032,
1036 (1976); State v. Laurinof 106 Ariz. 586, 480 P.2d 342, 344
(1971).
In the instant case, the record is clear that
defendant's guilty plea guilty plea was krjowingly, voluntarily
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and intelligently entered in accordance with Boykin.

At the

January 24, 1984 guilty plea hearing, Judge Banks questioned
defendant to determine whether defendant's guilty plea was made
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily (R. 88, p. 2-5) (See
Addendum "B"; Transcript).

The court asked defendant if he had

reviewed his constitutional rights and the waiver thereof as set
forth in defendant's affidavit. Ici. at 2 (See Addendum "C"; Plea
Affidavit).

The Plea Affidavit, signed by defendant, fully

explains the underlying facts of the charge, the elements of the
offense, the maximum sentence which may be imposed, and the full
array of constitutional rights that are waived by a guilty plea.
Id.

Defendant indicated that he had reviewed his constitutional

rights and understood the rights he was waiving (^d-)

Defendant

was then afforded an opportunity to question the court about the
waiver of his constitutional rights, which he declined. Id.
When defendant was asked if there had been any promises
made to induce his guilty plea, defendant answered in the
negative. 2^»

at

3.

Defendant also denied the existence of any

promises as to the sentence which may be imposed by the court and
denied that any threat, duress, or any other undue influence was
exerted on him to enter a guilty plea. Id.
The Court explained to defendant that by entering a
guilty plea to the Attempted Mayhem charge, the conviction would
carry a sentence of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison
and/or a fine not exceeding $5,000. Id.

The Court then asked

defendant whether he was under the influence of any drugs,
narcotics, or alcoholic beverages or whether defendant had any

-12-

physical or mental disability that would interfere with his
ability to freely enter a guilty plea. Id. at 3-4.

Defendant

responded in the negative. Id.
The Court asked defendant how he pled to Attempted
Mayhem, a third degree felony, occurring at 73 East 400 South, in
Salt Lake County, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-105
(1953, as amended), in that defendant attempted to commit mayhem
upon Michael S. Terry by unlawfully and intentionally depriving
Mr. Terry of a member of his body, to wit; an ear, and/or by
unlawfully and intentionally slitting the £ar of Michael S.
Terry. (R. 88. p. 4; Addendum "B").
"guilty." Id.

Defendant responded,

The Court then entered findings that defendant's

guilty plea was "freely and voluntarily made." Id.
Regardless of these facts, defendant asserts that his
guilty plea was improperly entered because he did not understand
the consequences of the guilty plea.

As ^ully explained by the

court, the direct consequences of defendant's guilty plea would
be a prison sentence of zero to five yeark and/or a fine not
exceeding $5,000. Jd. at 3.

The Court explained to defendant

that the Court may order the sentence to run consecutively or
concurrently with a sentence the defendant was presently serving
in the Utah State Prison Id. at 5.
concurrent sentence.

Defendant was given a

Defendant knew and unequivocably accepted

the fact that he would receive a sentence of not more than five
years in the Utah State Prison for the Attempted Mayhem
conviction.

The legal consequences of defendant's guilty plea,

as understood by defendant at the time he entered his guilty
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plea, remained exactly the same regardless of the subsequent
sentence reduction in defendant's collateral case and
irrespective of a policy change of the Board of Pardons.

The

crux of defendant's present claim is that he did not know at the
time of his plea to Attempted Mayhem that his second-degree
murder conviction would be reduced to Manslaughter.

Defendant's

belated regret that he pled guilty to a reduced charge cannot be
grounds for invalidating a voluntary, intelligent, and knowing
guilty plea.
Notably, defendant fails to cite any legal authority
for his claim that the trial court erred in not informing him
that a concurrent five to life sentence on an unrelated change
may be reversed on appeal.

See State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341,

1344 (Utah 1984)(Appellant must support claim with relevant legal
analysis and authority).

Indeed, it appears to be a novel claim.

However, to allow an unrelated and unpredictable future event to
establish grounds to invalidate an otherwise knowing and
voluntary guilty plea would be contrary to the public policy
regarding the finality of criminal judgments. Cf. Codianna v.
Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1105 (Utah 1983).
B. Defendant's Guilty Plea Was Entered In Compliance
With Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-ll(e)(Supp. 1988).

Defendant avers to a policy change of the Board of Pardons in
support of his claim that he did not understand the consequences
of his guilty plea. (Brief of App. at p. 6). However, because
defendant fails to identify the policy change or specify how it
is relevant to his legal claim, respondent is without sufficient
information to directly respond. See State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d
1341, 1344 (Utah 1984). In any event, a subsequent policy change
of the Board of Pardons should not affect the voluntariness of a
previously entered guilty plea.
-14-

1.

The Gibbons Standard Does Not Apply To This Case.

Defendant contends that his guiltV plea was taken in
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-ll(e)(Supp. 1988).

Defendant

bases this claim on the application of State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d
1309 (Utah 1987) which provides for a strict reading of Rule
11(e).

However, defendant's application of the Gibbons standard

in this case is misplaced.
As this Court stated in State v. vasiiacopulos, 756
P.2d 92 (Utah App. 1988) cert, denied Stat^ v. Vasiiacopulos, 765
P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988):
In the instant case, defendant entered his
plea on February 17, 1984. Therefore, the
strict Rule 11(e) compliance standard
established under Gibbons in 1987 does not
apply. See United States v. Johnson, 457
U.S. 537 (1982); State v. Norton, 675 P.2d
577 (Utah 1983) (when a new rule of criminal
procedure constitutes a clear break with the
past, it will not be applied retroactively).
Rather, we will apply the Warner-Brooks test
to determine whether the record as a whole
affirmatively establishes defendant entered
his plea with full knowledge and
understanding of its consequences, namely the
possibility of the imposition of consecutive
sentences.
Vasiiacopulos, at 94.
In the case at bar, defendant entered his guilty plea
on January 24, 1984, three weeks before the defendant in
Vasiiacopulos entered his plea.

Thus, because defendant's plea

was entered prior to Utah Supreme Court'^ 1987 decision in
Gibbons, that case is not controlling in the present case and
defendant'8 request to reconsider the retroactivity of Gibbons is
unjustified.

-15-

2. Under the Warner-Brooks Test, Defendant's Plea
Was Properly Entered.
Defendant argues that even if Gibbons does not apply,
the record below still establishes that Judge Uno abused his
discretion in refusing to grant defendant's Motion to Withdraw
his Guilty Plea.

Defendant claims that the record establishes an

abuse of discretion because Judge Banks failed to strictly adhere
to the procedures outlined in Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-11(e)(Supp.
1988).

Rule 11(e) prescribes the procedures to be followed by a

trial court in accepting a guilty plea:
The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty
or no contest and shall not accept such a plea
until the court has made the findings:
(1) That if the defendant is not
represented by counsel he has knowingly
waived his right to counsel and does not
desire counsel;
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) That the defendant knows he has
rights against compulsory self-incrimination,
to a jury trial and to confront and crossexamine in open court the witnesses against
him, and that by entering the plea he waives
all of those rights;
(4) That the defendant understands the
nature and elements of the offense to which
he is entering the plea; that upon trial the
prosecution would have the burden of proving
each of those elements beyond a reasonable
doubt; and that the plea is an admission of
all those elements:
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum
and maximum sentence that may be imposed upon
him for each offense to which a plea is
entered, including the possibility of the
imposition of consecutive sentences; and
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result
of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement
and if so, what agreement has been reached*
If it appears that the prosecuting
attorney or any other party has agreed to
request or recommend the acceptance of a plea
to a less included offense, or the dismissal
of other charges, the same shall be approved
-16-

by the court. If recommendations &s to
sentence are allowed by the court, the court
shall advise the defendant personally that
any recommendation as to sentence ^Ls not
binding on the court.
Specifically, defendant alleges tfyat Judge Banks failed
to comply with three subsections of Rule 11(e):

(1) that

defendant was not informed of his constitutional rights and the
waiver thereof as required by Rule 11(e)(3): (2) that defendant
did not understand the nature and elements 0f the offense to
which he was entering the plea as required ^y Rule 11(e)(4); and,
(3) that defendant did not know the possibility of the imposition
of a consecutive sentence as required by Rule 11(e)(5).
As noted above, the Warner-Brooks standard governs the
requirements of Rule 11(e) in this case.

Warner v. Morris, 709

P.2d 309 (Utah 1985); Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310 (Utah 1985).
See also State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403 (Utah 1986).

Under

Warner-Brooks, the "record as a whole" standard is applied by the
appellate court to determine whether the defendant entered his
plea with full knowledge and understandinglof the offense of
which he had been charged, its elements, axfid the nature of the
sentence he may receive.
In Warner & Brooks, the trial court failed to ask
specifically if "he [defendant] was aware that he had a right
against compulsory self-incrimination" Warber, 709 P.2d at 310.
Despite the trial court's failure to address the issue, the
Supreme Court stated "that the record as a whole affirmatively
i

establishes that defendant entered his plea with full knowledge
and understanding of its consequences. . .1 . " Id. at 310.
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In Miller, the defendant argued the trial court abused
its discretion by refusing to allow him to withdraw his guilty
plea since he did not understand the nature of the charges
against him or the consequences of his plea.
405.

Miller, 718 P.2d at

This Court found that although the trial court did not make

a specific finding to this effect, "the absence of a finding
under this section is not critical so long as the record as a
whole affirmatively establishes that the defendant entered his
plea with full knowledge and understanding of its consequences
and of the rights he was waiving . . . .H Id.
Miller# Warner and Brooks indicate that a trial court
accepting a guilty plea is not constitutionally required to do
all that Rule 11(e) lists.

Constitutionally, all that is

required is that the overall record discloses the defendant
voluntarily and intelligently entered his guilty plea.
In the instant case, the record as a whole establishes
that defendant entered his guilty plea intelligently and
voluntarily in accordance with S 77-35-ll(e).

In particular, the

record establishes that defendant understood the nature and
elements of the offense to which he pled guilty and the
relationship of the facts to the law as required by Rule
11(e)(4).

At the preliminary hearing on September 8, 1983,

defendant waived a formal reading of the information (R. 4). The
victim, Michael Steven Terry, testified twice about the assault
(R. 4). During his second statement, Mr. Terry's testimony
consisted of the fact that the upper part of his ear was missing
(R. 5). Defendant was present during the testimony (R. 5).
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Defendant was arraigned in the District Court on
November 3, 1983 (R. 12). A copy of the information was handed
to defendant and he entered a plea of Hnot guilty" to the Mayhem
charge (R. 12). The probable cause statement in the information
clearly sets forth the fact that defendant ^as charged with
biting off the upper portion of Mr. Terry's ear (R. 11) (See
Addendum "A"; Information).

On January 24, 1984, defendant

entered a plea of "guilty" to Attempted Mayhem.

(R. 16). The

following dialogue occurred at the change of plea hearing:
The Court: Have you gone over ycfur constitutional
rights and the waiver thereof as set forth lin vour affidavit?
Mr. Velarde:

Yes, sir.

The Court: Any questions you woiild care to ask the
Court with reference to your constitutional rights or the waiver
thereor?
Mr. Velarde: No, sir.
The Court: Has there been any promises made to you to
get you to enter a plea?
Mr. Velarde:

No, sir.

The Court: Has there been any promises made as to what
the Court would do on sentencing in this chse?
Mr. Velarde:

No, sir.

The Court: By entering a plea to the included offense,
that carries of sentence of zero to five years in the Utah State
Penitentiary and/or a fine not to exceed $5,000. By entering a
plea of guilty, you do, in fact, admit thd acts that support that
charge.
How old are you?
Mr. Velarde:
The Court:

28, sir.

Do you read and write the English language?

Mr. Velarde: Yes.
The Court: Have ,ui« ^^ecute th^ affidavit.

-19

Are you presently under the influence of any durge,
narcotics or alcoholic beverages?
Mr. Velarde:

No, sir.

The Court: Do you feel you have any physical or mental
disability as such that interferes with your free choice to enter
such a plea?
Mr. Velarde:

No, sir.

The Court: Are you freely and voluntarily entering a
plea of guilty at this time?
Mr. Velarde: Yes.
The Court: All right. To the included offense of
attempted mayhem, a third-degree felony as I have described it to
you, which occurred at 73 East 400 South, in Salt Lake County
State of Utah, on or about March 4, 1983, In violation of Title
76, Chapter 5, Section 102, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended, in that you, Jerry Lee Velarde, attempted to commit
Mayhem upon Michael S. Terry by unlawfully and intentionally
depriving Michael S. Terry of a member of his body, to wit: an
ear, and/or by unlawfully and intentionally slitting the ear of
Michael S. Terry, whay now is your plea? Guilty or nor guilty?
Mr. Velarde:

Guilty.

The Court: Plea of guilty is received, and the Court
finds that is was freely and voluntarily made by the defendant,
that he is not presently under the influence of any durgs,
narcotics or alcoholic beverages, nor has a physical or mental
disability as such that interferes with his free choice to enter
such a plea.
I base those findings on my observations of the
defendant here in the courtroom, together with the questions that
were put to him and his responses thereto.
You have a right to be sentenced in not less than two
no more than 30 days. What is your preference?
Mr. Valdez: We would waive the minimum time, your
honor, and ask you to sentence him today.
The Court: You understand, by being sentenced today, I
would commit you to the penitentiary?
Mr. Velarde:

Yes, sir.

The Court: It is the judgment of the court that you be
sentenced to — are you out at the penitentiary now?
Mr. Velarde:

Yes, I am.
-20-

The Court: I neglected to tell y6u, then — I wasn't
aware of that — I can allow that to run consecutively or
concurrently with the sentence you are presently serving out
there•
Do you understand that?
Mr. Velarde: Yes.
(R. 88; Addendum "A" at pp. 2-5) (emphasis added).
As shown above, defendant clearly received "real notice
of the true nature of the charge against him."
Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 (1976).

Henderson v.

Furthermore, based upon the

preliminary hearing testimony, defendant understood "the elements
of the crimes charged and the relationship!of the law to the
facts."

Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312.
The Plea Hearing Transcript and the Plea Affidavit also

establish that defendant understood the constitutional rights he
was waiving by means of entering a guilty (plea as reqired by Rule
11(e)(3).

Judge Banks asked defendant whether he understood his

constitutional rights as explained in the Plea Affidavit
(Addendum "A" at p. 2). The Plea Affidavit explains that a
guilty plea is a waiver of the privilege Against selfincrimination, the right to a jury trial, and the right to
confront his accusers (R. 16; Addendum M Cf). Defendant
acknowledged that he understood his rights. Id.
Lastly, the record establishes that defendant
understood the full legal consequences of his guilty plea as
required by Rule 11(e)(5).

As quoted abdve, Judge Banks

explained to defendant that a guilty pled to the Attempted Mayhem
charge would carry a maximum sentence of zero to five years
and/or a fine of $5,000. ^d.

The Judge further explained that he
-21-

could order the sentences to run consecutively or concurrently
with defendant's other sentence. j[d. at 5.

Notably, the Judge

ordered concurrent/ not consecutive sentences. Jd. at 5.
Overwhelmingly, the trial record establishes that
defendant understood the nature and elements of the charge, the
constitutional rights waived by entering a plea of guilty, the
maximum penalties which may be imposed, and the fact that the
Judge may order the sentence to run concurrently or consecutively
with defendant's other sentence.

Thus, Judge Uno did not abuse

his discretion in finding that defendant's plea was properly
entered pursuant to Rule 11(e).
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, respondent respectfully
requests this Court to affirm the lower court's denial of
defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea.

is / A—-—rlay of February, 1989.
DATED this
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

• _

^5

SC-.

S^f^g^^

DAN R. LARSEN
Assistant Attorney General
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£&

of February, 1989.

23-

ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
Issued by: R. Reese
THE STATE OF UTAH
BAIL: NO BAIL
Juaye

VS.
INFORMATION
Criminal No.

JERKY LEE VELARDE
lU/OJ/SS

83FS

2217

Uetendant(s)•
(Address/DUB)
The undersigned Pet, Shelton (SLCPD)
unaer oath states on information and Deliet that the detendant(s)
committed the crimes ot:
MAYHEM, a becond Degree Felony, at 73 East 40U South, in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, on or about March 4, 1983,
"Tn violation of Title 76,Chapter
£ , Section 105, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that the defendant,
/vw.V
JERRY LEE VELARDE, a party to the offense, committed
mayhem upon Michael S. Terry by unlawfully and intentionQ
ally depriving Michael S, Terry of a member of his body,
towit: an ear, and/or by unlawfully and intentionally
suttiny the ear of Michael S. Terry;

n

I
NO bAIL REQULST: The defendant, JERRY LEE VELARDE, is currently on parole from the Utah State Prison for other felony
crimes, Theretore, pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Utah
Constitution, it is requested that the defendant be held
without bail on the above charge.

This intormation is based
on evidence obtained trom
the following witnesses:
Coraon Parks
Sgt« Mike Fierro
Michael b. Terry
James S. Holm

Subscribed and sworn to me
this 22nd day ot August
19 83
•'
^

^

Qji^o
Judge

Authorized tor presentmeryc afnd tiling:
COUNTY ATTORNEY

'M^L

DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY

INFORMATION
State vs. JERRY LEE VELARDE

?3FS

2217

County Attorney # 83-1-60402
Paye Two
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: The affiant, a Salt Lake City
Police Detective, bases this on the following:
His reading ot report # 83-1-7321, which states that, at
the above time, date and location, the defendant, Jerry Lee
Velarae, jumped on the victim, Michaei S. Terry, and bit off
the upper portion of the victim's ear, completely tearing the
upper portion away from the ear itself.

ADDENDUM B

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BEFORE THE HONORABLE JAY E. BANKS
--OO0OO-STATE OF UTAH,
PLAINTIFF,
VS.
JERRY LEE VELARDE,
DEFENDANT.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORIGINAL
CASE NO. CR-83-1219

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

TAKEN AT:

METROPOLITAN HALL OF JUSTICE; SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

APPEARANCES:
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH:

ERNIE JONES
DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY

FOR THE DEFENDANT:

JAMES VALDEZ, ESQ.
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER'S
ASSOCIATION

DATE:

JANUARY 2k,

198U

Robyn Haynle
Haynlc & Snider
817 Lake Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
(801) 531-6116

1

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; TUESDAY, JANUARY 24, 1984

2

9:30 A.M.

3I

—OO0OO--

4
51

THE COURT:

*

MR. VALDEZ:

7

THE COURT:

THAT

ALL RIGHT.

WHAT IS THE ANTICIPATED

PLEA?

10

MR. VALDEZ:

11

THE COURT:

12

THAT'S MY MATTER, YOUR HONOR.

IS SET FOR A CHANGE OF PLEA.

8
9

JERRY LEE VELARDE?

PLEA TO A THIRD DEGREE, ATTEMPTED.
ATTEMPTED MAYHEM?

THIRD DEGREE,

ATTEMPED MAYHEM?

13

IS YOUR TRUE AND CORRECT NAME JERRY LEE VELARDE?

14

MR. VELARDE:

15

THE COURT:

YES, SIR.

HAVE YOU GONE OVER YOUR

16 I CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THE WAIVER THEREOF AS SET FORTH IN
17

YOUR AFFIDAVIT?

18

MR. VELARDE:

19

THE COURT:

20

YES, SIR.

DO YOU UNDERSTAND THOSE RIGHTS THAT

YOU ARE WAIVING?

21

MR. VELARDE:

22

THE COURT:

YES, SIR.

ANY QUESTIONS YOU WOULD CARE TO ASK

23

THE COURT WITH REFERENCE TO YOUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OR THE

24

WAIVER THEREOF?

25

MR. VELARDE:

NO, SIR|.

1
2

THE COURT:

HAS THERE BEEN ANY PROMISES MADE TO

YOU TO GET YOU TO ENTER A PLEA?

3

MR. VELARDE:

4

THE COURT:

S

NO, SIR.

HAS THERE BEEN ANY PROMISES MADE AS

TO WHAT THE COURT WOULD DO ON SENTENCING IN THIS CASE?

6

MR. VELARDE:

7

THE COURT:

NO, SIR.
HAS THERE BEEN ANY THREATS, DURESS OR

8

ANY OTHER UNDUE INFLUENCE EXERTED ON YOU TO GET YOU TO ENTER

9

A PLEA?

10

MR. VELARDE:

11

THE COURT:

NO, SIR.
BY ENTERING A PLEA TO THE INCLUDED

12

OFFENSE, THAT CARRIES

13

THE UTAH STATE PENITENTIARY AND/OR A FINE NOT TO EXCEED

H

$5,000.

15

THE ACTS THAT SUPPORT THAT CHARGE.

A SENTENCE OF ZERO TO FIVE YEARS IN

BY ENTERING A PLEA OF GUILTY, YOU DO, IN FACT, ADMIT

16

HOW OLD ARE YOU?

17

MR. VELARDE:

18]

THE COURT:

19

28, SIR.
DO YOU REAP AND WRITE THE ENGLISH

LANGUAGE?

20]

MR. VELARDE:

21

THE COURT:

22

ARE YOU PRESENTLY UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ANY

23

YES.

HAVE HIM EXECUTE THE AFFIDAVIT.

DRUGS, NARCOTICS OR ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES?

24

MR. VELARDE:

25

THE COURT:

NO, SIR.
DO YOU FEEL YOU HAVE ANY PHYSICAL OR

1| MENTAL DISABILITY AS SUCH THAT INTE»PPD.ES WITH YOUR FREE
2

CHOICE TO ENTER SUCH A PLEA?

31

MR. VELARDE:

41

THE COURT:

5

NO, SIR.
ARE YOU FRfiELY AND VOLUNTARILY

ENTERING A PLEA OF GUILTY AT THIS tlME?

6\

MR. VELARDE:

7

THE COURT:

YES.
ALL RIGHT.

TO THE INCLUDED OFFENSE

8 1 OF ATTEMPTED MAYHEM, A THIRD-DEGREE FELONY AS I HAVE
9

DESCRIBED IT TO YOU, WHICH OCCURRED AT 73 EAST «f0 0 SOUTH, IN
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, ON OR ABOUT MARCH H, 1983,

10
11
12

IN VIOLATION OF TITLE 76, CHAPTER 5, SECTION 105, UTAH CODE
i
ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED, IN THAT YOU, JERRY LEE VELARDE,

13

ATTEMPTED TO COMMIT MAYHEM UPON MltHAEL S. TERRY BY

I

U I UNLAWFULLY AND INTENTIONALLY DEPRIVING MICHAEL S. TERRY OF A
15

MEMBER OF HIS BODY, TO WIT: AN EAR, AND/OR BY UNLAWFULLY AND

16

INTENTIONALLY SLITTING THE EAR OF MICHAEL S. TERRY,

17

IS YOUR PLEA?

WHAT NOW

GUILTY OR NOT GUILTff?

18

MR. VELARDE:

1*

THE COURT:

GUILTY.
PLEA OF GUjILTY IS RECEIVED, AND THE

20

COURT FINDS THAT IT WAS FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY MADE BY THE

21

DEFENDANT, THAT HE IS NOT PRESENTLY UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF

22

ANY DRUGS, NARCOTICS OR ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES, NOR HAS A

23

PHYSICAL OR MENTAL DISABILITY AS SUCH THAT INTERFERES WITH

24 1 HIS FREE CHOICE TO ENTER SUCH A P1JEA.
25

I BASE THOSE FINDINGS ON MY OBSERVATIONS OF THE

DEFENDANT HERE IN THE COURTROOM, TOGETHER WITH THE QUESTIONS
THAT WERE PUT TO HIM AND HIS RESPONSES THERETO.
YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO BE SENTENCED IN NOT LESS THAN
TWO NOR MORE THAN 3 0 DAYS.
MR. VALDEZ:

WHAT IS YOUR PREFERENCE?

WE WOULD l^AIVE THE MINIMUM TIME,

YOUR HONOR, AND ASK YOU SENTENCE HIM TODAY.
THE COURT:

YOU UNDERSTAND, BY BEING SENTENCED

TODAY, I WOULD COMMIT YOU TO THE FJENITENTIARY?
MR. VELARDE:
THE COURT:

YES, SIR.
IT IS THE I JUDGMENT OF THE COURT THAT

YOU BE SENTENCED TO -- ARE YOU OUf AT THE PENITENTIARY NOW?
MR. VELARDE:
THE COURT:
WASN'T AWARE OF THAT —

YES, I AM.
I NEGLECTJED TO TELL YOU, THEN -- I
I CAN ALLOW THAT TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY

OR CONCURRENTLY WITH THE SENTENCE^ YOU ARE PRESENTLY SERVING
OUT THERE.
DO YOU UNDERSTAND TH^T?
MR. VELARDE:
THE COURT:

YES.
WHAT AREl YOU SERVING OUT THERE?

MR. VELARDE:
THE COURT:

FIVE Tb LIFE.
IT WILL RUN CONCURRENTLY.

I WILL

SENTENCE YOU TO ZERO TO FIVE YEARS IN THE UTAH STATE
PENITENTIARY.

COMMITMENT WILL ISSUE FORTHWITH, AND 1 WILL

ALLOW IT TO RUN CONCURRENTLY WITH THE FIVE TO LIFE SENTENCE
YOU ARE PRESENTLY SERVING.
MR. VALDEZ:

THANK (YOU.

1

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

2
3

I, ROBYN HAYNIE, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE

4

FOREGOING PAGES 2 THROUGH 5, INCLUSIVE, COMPRISE A

5

FULL, TRUE AND.CORRECT TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROCEEDINGS

6

HAD UPON THE HEARING OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER ON

7

JANUARY 24, 1984, AND THAT SAID TRANSCRIPT CONTAINS

8

ALL OF THE EVIDENCE, ALL OF THE OBJECTIONS OF COUNSEL

9

AND RULINGS OF THE COURT, AND ALL MATTERS TO WHICH THE

10
11

SAME RELATE.
DATED THIS 12TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 1988.

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

ROBYN HAYNIE, CSR/RPR

ADDENDUM C

At aST&torUi

Court o f t h e T h i r d J u d i c i a l " — J
State of Utah

A N

2

4 ^ 4

Affidavit of Defendant
Criminal No.
under oath, hereby Acknowledge that I have entered a plea of
guilty to the c h a r t s ) of:

$IUI*TP&</
(Name o^yrime)
Facts:

I have received a copy of the charge (Jnformati/nj) and understa
(Degree of Felony

crime I am pleading guilty to is a

Class of Mtsdemea

and understand the punishment for this crime may be
prison term..

/ZiAo */&

fine, orboth.J
both am not on drugs oralcphc

My plea of guilty is freely and voluntarily made. I am represented by Attorney
who has explained my rights to me and I understand them.

^"f

5

1. I know that I have a constitutional right to plead not guilty and to have a jury trial upon the charge to which I
have entered a plea of guilty, or to a trial by a judge should I desire.

2. I know that if I wish to have a trial. I have a right to see and hear the witnesses against me in open court in my
presence and before the Judge and jury with the right to have those witnesses cross examined by my attorney. I also
know that I have a right to have my witnesses subpoenaed at state expense to testify in court upon my behalf and
that I could testify on my own behalf, and that if I choose not to do so. the jury will be told that this may not be held
against me.
3. I know that if i were to have a trial that the prosecutor must prove each and every element of the crime charged
beyond a reasonable doubt, that any verdict rendered by a jury whether it be that of guilty or not guilty must be by a
complete agreement of all jurors.
4. I know that under the constitution that I have a right not to give evidence against myself and that this means that
I cannot be compelled to admit that I have committed any crime and cannot be compelled to testify unless 1 choose
to do so.
5. I know that under the constitution of Utah that if I were tried and convicted by a jury or by the Judge that I
would have a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of Utah for review of the trial
proceedings and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, that those costs would be paid by the
State without cost to me.
6. ! know and understand that by entering a plea of guilty ! am giving up my constitutional rights as set out in th<
preceeding paragraphs and that I am admitting I am guilty of the crime to which my plea of guilty is entered
7. I also know that if I am on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing upon another offense of which I have beet
convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my plea in the present action may result in consecutive sentences beinj
imposed on me.
(»;)'.)

or sentence or imprisonment upon me and no promises have been made to me by anyone as to what the sentence win
be.

9. No promises or threats of any kind have been made to induce me to plead guilty. The following other charges
pending against me. to-wtt (Court^se^numberfs) or count(s)):

i

will be dismissed, and that no other charge(s) will be Hied against me for other crimes I may have committed which
are now known to the prosecuting attorney. ! am also aware that any charge or sentencing concessions or
recommendations or probation or suspended sentences, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing made
or sought by either defense counsel or counsel for the State, is not binding On the Judge and may not be approved by
the Judge.
10 I h^ve read this Affidavit, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, andlknow and understand its contents. I
am O^Q
years of age. have attended school through the
understand the English language.
Dated this

£_Z

z£

and I can read and

day of

Subscribed and sworn to before me in Court this

CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY:

y

h

? d*JL.
Judge

*

y
A

I certify that I am the attorney for v Jc/tA+4 £ALZ<£ *&<1^*
% the defendant named above and I know he
has read the Affidavit, or that I have read it to4iim. and I discussed it with him and believe he fully understands the
meaning of its contents and is mentally and phyMcally competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief the statements,
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing Affidavit are in all respects accurate and true.

•Mt^
Defense Attoftfty
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTOR
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in its case a g a i n s t T _ _ ^ _
-y • defendant.
I have reviewed the Affidavit of the defendant and find that the declarations are/pue and accurate No improper
inducements, threats, or coercions to encourage a plea have been offered the defendant. There is reasonable cause to
believe the evidence would support the conviction of the defendant for the plea offered, and that acceptance of the plea
would serve the public interest.
"""* 7

•••£.yj'/CK.

tjfttisy
Prosecuting Attorney
V

ORDER

Baved upon the Tacts vet forth in the foregoing Affidavit and certification, the Court finds the defendant's plea of
guilty is freely and voluntarily made and it is ordered that defendant's plea of "Guilty" to the charge, set forth in the
Affidavit be accepted and entered. ^Q
^*
Done in Court thiy

X */

R DIXON HINDLEY
•»—fyf-fffr'Vl
0

day of

(J\%y^y

W
/ /

tfcpgfcCfcr*

, 19

£jL.

*>/?//
*

Distnct Judge
0 0 0 0

